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Abstract
Background: As in many countries around the world, there are high expectations on academic health science
centres and networks in England to provide high-quality care, innovative research, and world-class education, while also
supporting wealth creation and economic growth. Meeting these expectations increasingly depends on partnership
working between university medical schools and teaching hospitals, as well as other healthcare providers. However,
academic-clinical relationships in England are still characterised by the “unlinked partners” model, whereby universities
and their partner teaching hospitals are neither fiscally nor structurally linked, creating bifurcating accountabilities to
various government and public agencies.
Discussion: This article focuses on accountability relationships in universities and teaching hospitals, as well as other
healthcare providers that form core constituent parts of academic health science centres and networks. The authors
analyse accountability for the tripartite mission of patient care, research, and education, using a four-fold typology of
accountability relationships, which distinguishes between hierarchical (bureaucratic) accountability, legal accountability,
professional accountability, and political accountability. Examples from North West London suggest that a number of
mechanisms can be used to improve accountability for the tripartite mission through alignment, but that the simple
creation of academic health science centres and networks is probably not sufficient.
Summary: At the heart of the challenge for academic health science centres and networks is the separation of
accountabilities for patient care, research, and education in different government departments. Given that a
fundamental top-down system redesign is now extremely unlikely, local academic and clinical leaders face the
challenge of aligning their institutions as a matter of priority in order to improve accountability for the tripartite
mission from the bottom up. It remains to be seen which alignment mechanisms are most effective, and whether
they are strong enough to counter the separation of accountabilities for the tripartite mission at the national level, the
on-going structural fragmentation of the health system in England, and the unprecedented financial challenges that it
faces. Future research should focus on determining the comparative effectiveness of different alignment mechanisms,
developing standardised metrics and key performance indicators, evaluating and assessing academic health science
centres and networks, and empirically addressing leadership issues.
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Background
As in many countries around the world, there are high ex-
pectations on academic health science centres and net-
works in England to provide high-quality care, innovative
research, and world-class education, while also supporting
wealth creation and economic growth [1-16]. An academic
health science centre (AHSC), also known in different
countries as an academic health centre (AHC), academic
medical centre (AMC), or university medical centre (UMC)
is not a single institution, but “a constellation of functions
and organizations committed to improving the health of
patients and populations through the integration of their
roles in research, education, and patient care” [17]. An
AHSC is comprised of a “medical school, one or more
other health profession schools or programs (such as allied
health, dentistry, graduate studies, nursing, pharmacy, pub-
lic health, veterinary medicine), and one or more owned or
affiliated teaching hospitals or health systems” [18]. An
AHSC is usually nested within an academic health science
network (AHSN), which shares the AHSC’s commitment
to improving the health of patients and populations
through research, education, and patient care, but co-
ordinates an even greater number of functions and organi-
sations to ensure the speedy adoption and diffusion of
innovation across a large number of organisations [9-12].
Thus, meeting the expectations for AHSCs or AHSNs
increasingly depends on partnership working between
university medical schools, teaching hospitals, and other
healthcare providers in integrating their roles in research,
education, and patient care.
The “unlinked partners” model of academic-clinical
relationships
For its many strengths and outstanding features – such as
universal access to healthcare free at the point of delivery,
publicly-funded research and education, national work-
force planning, and subsidised tuition fees for medical
students – the National Health Service (NHS) in England
is not without weaknesses. Namely, it is not well linked to
various components of academic medicine.
Teaching and research intensive hospitals (hereafter
teaching hospitals) and medical schools are run by separate
organisations, and those teaching hospitals that belong to
different NHS trusts are separate from each other. NHS
trusts are statutory public bodies that operate hospitals and
specialised health centres; they are answerable to the UK
government’s Department of Health through the NHS hier-
archy and are funded almost entirely from general taxation.
Teaching hospitals are neither structurally integrated
with primary care, nor with social care. While secondary,
tertiary, and mental health care is provided by NHS
trusts, primary care is provided by general practitioners
(GPs), who operate as independent contractors for the
NHS and are not part of its organisational structure.
Likewise, social services are provided by independent
local authorities funded partly by central government
grants and partly by local taxes and revenues.
Academic-clinical relationships in England are charac-
terised by the “unlinked partners” model [19] (Figure 1),
whereby medical schools and their partner teaching hospi-
tals are not structurally integrated and operate under separ-
ate governance arrangements [7,19]. All medical schools
are now part of universities – independent self-governing
institutions, which are funded approximately equally by
public and private sources [20]. Unlike many AHSCs in
North America, medical schools in England do not own or
govern faculty practice plans, which allow medically-
qualified faculty to undertake clinical practice in owned or
affiliated teaching hospitals and use the arising patient care
revenue to cross-subsidise research and education in med-
ical schools. Moreover, neither medical school deans, nor
teaching hospital chief executive officers (CEOs), report to
each other.
As a result of the “unlinked partners” model, university
medical schools and their partner healthcare providers
employ disparate finance and performance reporting
metrics and indicators, no joint executive authority ex-
ists over the academic and clinical missions spanning
the totality of patient care, research, and education, there
is no joint staff appraisal and performance review process,
and organisational cultures across the academic and
clinical enterprises differ significantly [21].
At the root of these arrangements is funding from and
accountability to separate government departments for
higher education and health. The British government
operates on the principle of “ministerial responsibility”,
under which each minister is accountable for the actions
of his or her own department. This system creates strong
internal accountability, but also creates barriers to cross-
departmental working [22].
Recent years have seen innovations in governance
intended to overcome the disadvantages to academic medi-
cine caused by this bifurcating accountability. The most
common model has been the intermediate organisation,
straddling the boundary between universities and NHS in-
stitutions. There has been, as yet, no systematic evaluation
of the effect of these innovations, but there is growing evi-
dence based on expert opinion and case studies of new and
fruitful dynamics in some cases [4,7,8,13,15,23].
Current policy context
Two aspects of the current policy context in England are
likely to further militate against an environment that is sup-
portive of academic medicine. One is the unprecedented fi-
nancial challenges for the NHS in the broader context of
growing demand and sustained constraint in public ex-
penditure. Another is the recent re-organisation of the
NHS arising from the Health and Social Care Act 2012.
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Unprecedented financial challenges
It should be borne in mind that the English NHS is almost
entirely tax-funded. Resources are allocated to providers
of care through a quasi-market mechanism, whereby pub-
lic monies are allocated to state-owned or authorised
commissioning organisations, which contract with pro-
viding organisations to deliver care to NHS patients.
According to those now leading the NHS in England,
there will be a £60 billion per annum gap between
funding and requirements by 2025 [24]. More inde-
pendent analysis also predicts funding shortfalls on an
unprecedented scale [25].
In this situation, given the doctrine of ministerial
responsibility, it can be predicted that the main consid-
eration when deciding upon funding cuts will be to
minimise impact on the primary missions of depart-
ments, i.e. health in the case of the Department of
Health and teaching and research in the case of the De-
partment for Business, Innovation and Skills [26]. The
extent to which each sector supports the other in the
co-production of the tripartite mission of patient care,
research, and education may prove to be a secondary
consideration.
Health and Social Care Act 2012
Although the regional perspective has been historically
important for the development of academic medicine
in England [27], the recent re-organisation of the NHS
arising from the Health and Social Care Act 2012 has led
to a system in which no organisation has a clear mandate
for strategic planning at the regional level. The relevant
aspects of the re-organisation are the following:
First, responsibility for commissioning health care
has been transferred to two types of organisation. At
the local level, these are newly-formed clinical commis-
sioning groups (CCGs) led by GPs, which replace man-
agerially-led primary care trusts. At the national level,
NHS England (formerly called the NHS Commissioning
Board) is responsible both for authorisation and oversight
of CCGs, and also for commissioning, through its regional
and local area teams, of a wide range of services, including
many specialist services provided in teaching hospitals.
Second, all NHS providers, including teaching hospi-
tals, will have to become “NHS foundation trusts” (FTs),
or join other FTs through mergers or takeovers. FTs are
more autonomous NHS organisations, over which the
Department of Health has no direct control. They allow
Figure 1 The “unlinked partners” model of academic-clinical relationships in England, 2014. The left and right panels represent funding and
accountability relationships in the academic and clinical enterprises of AHSCs and AHSNs, respectively. Solid arrowed lines ( ) indicate major
funding flows; arrowed dash lines ( ) indicate accountability relationships. Adapted from: Ovseiko et al. [7] and Department of Health: Equity
and Excellence: Liberating the NHS. London: Department of Health; 2010.
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better accountability to local communities through the
new layer of governance that exists in all FTs – the
council of governors representing local community in-
terests. The accelerated conversion of teaching hospitals
into FTs increases competition in the NHS quasi-
market, but also makes collaboration more difficult be-
cause “their [FTs’] regulatory regime requires them to
place organisational survival before collaboration” [28].
Third, entry into the NHS quasi-market of independent
(non-NHS owned) providers of care to NHS patients is
being further encouraged, so that there may be a wider
variety of types of organisations providing care, although it
is very unlikely that there will be any non-NHS owned
teaching hospitals in England.
Finally, economic regulation of the NHS quasi-market
will now be undertaken by the arm’s-length body, Monitor,
in conjunction with the Office of Fair Trading. The Health
and Social Care Act 2012 imposes an obligation on the
Secretary of State (i.e. the government minister), NHS
England, Monitor, and CCGs to promote research, but
there is no obligation on providers to carry out research.
Despite the potential negative consequences of the reor-
ganisation of the NHS, the increased autonomy of
providers could be beneficial to research. Whilst the obli-
gations on the NHS to promote research and use evi-
dence arising from research are universal, the capacity to
undertake research varies across England. The Health and
Social Care Act 2012 empowers local NHS organisa-
tions to both promote and, importantly, financially sup-
port research. With this local knowledge and focus,
existing partnerships can bring about a closer alignment,
and where they do not currently exist, resources can be
made available to support their creation. Moreover, the
Health and Social Care Act 2012 raises the profile of
research and its importance to the NHS. Research is
now mentioned at the beginning of the Act, obligations
regarding research are placed on Monitor and, as men-
tioned above, local clinical commissioning groups not only
have duties placed on them, but explicit permission to use
resources at their disposal to support research. Legislation
concerning research in general, therefore, has created a
permissive environment that provides institutions with a
higher degree of freedom to create structures and relation-
ships to deliver world-class research.
Designation of AHSCs and AHSNs
The government, as well as local health economies, have
long recognised that the right balance between autonomy
and partnership has to be found to make the most of the
NHS quasi-market. In several policy initiatives over the
past years, the government challenged local academic and
clinical leaders to increase academic-clinical collaboration
through alignment within the constraints of the existing
system of accountability relationships.
In 2009, the government officially designated five aca-
demic-clinical partnerships as England’s first AHSCs to
foster medical innovation and high-quality care through
closer partnership between universities and teaching
hospitals [7]. A number of local health economies in
London subsequently set up wider partnerships to diffuse
innovations and improve care across many local NHS
trusts, as well as primary care and public health providers,
with AHSCs nested within these partnerships [8,11,29].
In 2011, the government deemed it desirable to have such
wider partnerships established everywhere in England
and subsequently invited interested parties to apply for
designation as AHSNs. These were envisaged as “a
unique opportunity to align education, clinical research,
informatics, innovation, training & education and health-
care delivery,” with the goal being “to improve patient and
population health outcomes by translating research into
practice and developing and implementing integrated
health care services” [10].
In 2013, the government designated new AHSNs with
the role of “increas[ing] strategic alignment of NHS pro-
viders and their university partners, specifically in
world-class research, health education and patient care
[in order to] improve health and healthcare delivery in-
cluding through increased translation of discoveries from
basic science into benefits for patients” [30]. The gov-
ernment designation was meant to enhance the prestige
of the designated organisations and to provide AHSNs
with start-up grants, but the government deliberately did
not set out new structural and governance arrangements
for AHSCs and AHSNs, recognising that the complexity
of the challenges to be addressed by them, in particular
AHSNs, required a new level of freedom to innovate.
Structures created to accommodate changes in the NHS
to align patient care with research and education are likely
to be strongest at the local level. As discussed, there are
many factors at the national level, from legislation to the
policies derived from it, that create innate challenges for
NHS/university partnerships. However, at local and now
potentially regional levels, relationships and partnerships
can be created that focus on local issues and develop work-
ing practices that are independent of national regimes.
This is particularly true where legal strategic partner-
ships are created, as the nature of these arrangements is
likely to survive further changes to the healthcare sector
by future governments.
A framework for the analysis of accountability
relationships
The “unlinked partners” model of academic-clinical rela-
tionships and the ongoing structural fragmentation of the
NHS result in a complex system of accountability relation-
ships in the universities and healthcare providers that form
the core constituent parts of AHSCs and AHSNs, which
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ultimately influences the capacity of academic and clinical
leaders to make strategic choices conducive to the advance-
ment of both their organisations and the public good.
In conceptual terms, accountability is “a strategy for
managing expectations” [31]. The need for such a strategy
arises because the public has the right to know what uni-
versities and teaching hospitals are doing in order to meet
public expectations for innovative health technology, high-
quality care, and wealth generation, while also responding
to economic demands for efficiency savings and funding
cuts during economic downturns.
In operational terms, “accountability involves relation-
ships in which an individual or agency is held to answer for
performance and involves some delegation of authority to
act” [32]. Through a system of accountability relationships
involving multiple government and public agencies, the
public delegates authority to act to medical school deans
and teaching hospital CEOs, and then holds them answer-
able for their performance. In turn, the deans and CEOs
face multiple and potentially conflicting expectations and
demands from staff members responsible for different as-
pects of patient care, research, and education that may not
fully align with each other, as well as from healthcare com-
missioners and higher education and research funders who
employ disparate performance metrics and indicators.
The complex system of accountability relationships in
AHSCs and AHSNs becomes clearer if we employ a
framework of accountability relationships, which was
originally developed by Romzek and Dubnick for the
United States’ National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration (NASA) [31] and then adapted for the analysis
of medical reform [32]. It distinguishes between four
types of accountability [31,32]:
 hierarchical (bureaucratic) accountability concerns
supervisory control by higher authorities;
 legal accountability concerns compliance with laws
and contractual obligations;
 professional accountability concerns compliance
with of the accepted norms and practices in one’s
profession or peer group;
 political accountability concerns responsiveness to
key stakeholders and constituents.
In what follows, we apply Romzek and Dubnick’s frame-
work to analyse accountability for the tripartite mission
of patient care, research, and education in universities
and teaching hospitals that form core constituent parts
of AHSCs and AHSNs. Then, using examples from the
AHSC and the AHSN in North West London, we outline
a number of mechanisms that academic and clinical
leaders can employ locally to improve accountability
for the tripartite mission through alignment. Finally, we
argue that to avoid AHSCs’ and AHSNs’ crumbling
under the weight of potentially conflicting expectations
and demands, the current accountability systems need
to be aligned as a matter of priority.
Discussion
Accountability for patient care
Under the current model of academic-clinical relation-
ships, all hierarchical, legal, and political accountability for
patient care is concentrated in the NHS, and universities
are free from any formal accountability for the provision
of patient care. Inadvertently, this limits the ability of
universities to increase the involvement of medical
school faculty in the provision of high-quality patient
care, dissemination of the latest technology, and trans-
lational research with immediate patient benefits.
On the one hand, universities’ funding through the
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills’ higher
education and research funding councils incentivises them
to employ basic scientists, who are less costly to employ
and may be perceived to be more productive than
physician-scientists (called “clinical academics” in England)
because basic scientists do not need to take time off from
their scientific work to provide patient care, and they tend
to publish in more prestigious scientific journals [33].
On the other hand, under the adverse conditions of the
economic downturn, NHS hospitals are dis-incentivised
from employing physician-scientists because they take time
off from their clinical work to do academic work, and the
NHS inadequately reimburses hospitals for innovation and
high-end specialist services that are usually provided by
physician-scientists. The current Payment by Results tariff
system for reimbursing NHS trusts is based on an average
price across England and thus can tip teaching hospitals
that provide complex high-quality services into deficit,
and can damage their ability to work with industry on
the development of new treatments [34]. Moreover, the re-
cent proposals of the Department of Health to abolish Clin-
ical Excellence Awards – which compensate outstanding
physician-scientists, who devote substantial time to re-
search and teaching, with longer hours and a lesser income
than full-time physicians – risks undermining the global
competitiveness of English AHSCs and AHSNs by making
physician-scientist careers in England unattractive [35].
Yet, funding from the National Institute of Health
Research (NIHR) offers a potential mechanism and in-
centives for universities to increase the involvement of
medical school faculty in the provision of high-quality
patient care, dissemination of the latest technology, and
translational research with immediate patient benefits.
Much of NIHR funding is either provided to univer-
sities, or to NHS/university partnerships. The NIHR
holds both universities and NHS organisations account-
able for this funding through contractual terms. There-
fore, this begins to align accountabilities for research
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and patient care, at least from a potential impact and
improvement perspective.
Hierarchical and legal accountabilities of university
staff with clinical responsibilities are managed through the
NHS. In order to undertake clinical practice, research, and
teaching, university-employed academic physician-scientists
must secure honorary contracts with teaching hospitals.
Honorary contracts deal with matters of indemnity and ac-
countability. They allow university faculty to undertake
clinical practice in the NHS setting, usually on an un-
paid basis. Universities and teaching hospitals are not
fiscally linked because they receive funding from and
are answerable to different government departments –
the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and
the Department of Health, respectively. Instead, they
operate the knock-for-knock arrangements, whereby
university-employed academic physicians provide pa-
tient care to NHS patients without charging the NHS,
and in return NHS staff provide teaching to medical stu-
dents without charging universities [7].
Neither universities nor teaching hospitals measure the
actual quantities of patient care and teaching provided as
part of these arrangements. This is, however, beginning to
change. It is now not unusual for individuals within a NHS
trust to have specific portions of their overall salary directly
linked to job plans identifying specific clinical, or research
time. Moreover, the NHS and university partners will each
contribute to the salary, therefore formally sharing the in-
vestment in research. Despite this change, there remains a
separation of hierarchical and legal accountability between
the NHS and universities, which makes it challenging for
some academic and clinical partners to agree and conduct
joint annual appraisal and performance review processes
for staff working across organisational boundaries [36].
Professional accountability rests with professional
regulatory bodies – the General Medical Council (GMC)
and the relevant specialty medical royal colleges and fac-
ulties. They are responsible for setting and monitoring
standards of medical education and training, registering
qualified doctors, revalidation, enforcing medical codes of
conduct, upholding professional values, issuing evidence-
based clinical guidelines, and participating in the appoint-
ments committees of NHS organisations. For quality and
safety of care, physicians are also accountable to each
other through clinical governance and risk management
groups in their organisations [37].
Political accountability is mediated by the democratic
election process, through which elected politicians hold top
civil servants in the Department of Health to account ac-
cording to the mandate and expectations of the public. In
practice, however, it is hard to distinguish between
hierarchical and political accountability because of the hier-
archical nature of the NHS in England [38]. Despite gov-
ernment’s numerous reforms, which attempted to decrease
ministers’ micromanagement of the NHS and involve pa-
tients and the public in decisions about local health ser-
vices, accountability to patients and local communities is
still limited and exists in parallel with centralised political
accountability [39]. For example, although many hospitals
have now converted their status to more autonomous
NHS foundation trusts (FTs) evidence to date indicates
that nationally-set objectives and targets still play a large
role in FTs’ decision-making [40]. Moreover, local clinical
commissioning groups (CCGs) are subject to a large de-
gree of national oversight by NHS England [41,42].
Accountability for research
In recent years, great advances have been made in enab-
ling research across universities and the NHS through
the implementation of the recommendations of Sir David
Cooksey’s review of UK research funding and the subse-
quent establishment of the NIHR in England [43]. Yet, the
English system for the funding of research remains notably
pluralistic, and both universities and the NHS maintain
separate systems of research governance, creating a chal-
lenge for integration at the institutional level of AHSCs
and AHSNs.
Hierarchical accountability for research involves par-
allel structures for universities and NHS bodies, which
overlap and sometimes combine in the field of clinical
research. Each sector has its own structures for research
governance, and these sit within a wider spectrum of re-
search regulation and governance. Directives from the
European Union, most notably the Clinical Trials Direct-
ive (2001/20/EC), add a further level to the structures
for hierarchical accountability. Concern about the nega-
tive effect of medical research regulation on the national
economy has led to the establishment in 2011 of a Health
Research Authority, with a mission to streamline the regu-
latory process and expedite research.
A further characteristic of the environment for medical
research in England is the rich mix of public and private
actors on both the payer and the provider side [44]. For
individual NHS/university partnerships, this complex
regulatory and funding environment has the potential
to create costly and duplicative research management and
governance structures. To try and mitigate this, univer-
sities and teaching hospitals are attempting to create joint
structures that seek to better align management though
integration of working practices and co-location of staff.
Establishing joint research offices is becoming more
common in England. However, this approach requires
significant investment, both financially and politically,
to overcome the inherent difficulties of working across
organisations. The desire to achieve economies of scale
via the combination of these structures is countered by
separate accountabilities and risk aversion, but there is
some room for pragmatic adaptation. For example, the
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NHS is able to act as “research sponsor” for clinical
studies led by university staff as it is more able to manage
the risk of clinical negligence liabilities. Although a joint
research office can be successful at dealing with govern-
ance and financial issues, it cannot in itself develop a
research strategy. It remains a problem that many NHS
trusts do not have a clear research strategy and often
have no clear framework for innovation undertaken
outside a research setting.
Legal accountability is overly complex and split dis-
proportionally between universities and teaching hospitals.
While the majority of clinical research is designed, carried
out, and reported by university-employed academic phys-
ician-scientists in collaboration with NHS-employed physi-
cians and nurses, hospital managers are legally responsible
for the approval of clinical research. Historically, because
research metrics have not been included in the annual
appraisal and performance review of hospital managers,
they tend to overemphasise patient safety risks and
underemphasise patient benefits from research. However,
the government has identified the need to see a significant
improvement in establishing clinical trials in the NHS
and, therefore, many NHS organisations are now including
research metrics in appraisal at divisional management
level, and several AHSNs have made this a priority area.
A better understanding and acceptance of risk would
benefit research in general and promote patient access
to innovations.
For government research funding, universities are ac-
countable to the Department for Business, Innovation and
Skills and its arm’s-length research funding councils, and
NHS trusts are accountable to the Department of Health
along with its arm’s length bodies, particularly those in-
volved in regulation. For public and private research
funding, universities and NHS trusts are accountable to
medical research charities, industry, and other funders
on the basis of contractual obligations.
Professional accountability mainly concerns research
integrity and is devolved to individual universities and
voluntary professional associations. Academic scientists are
accountable to their peers via university research integrity
and ethics committees, internal and external peer review,
and national and international professional associations in
any given research area. Academic physician-scientists are
also accountable to professional regulatory bodies, but uni-
versities and professional associations do not always have
coherent research integrity policies. A recent parliamentary
inquiry found “the general oversight of research integrity in
the UK to be unsatisfactory” [45] and reiterated an earlier
recommendation to establish a national oversight body for
research integrity [46]. Most NHS trusts that have research
integrity policies in relation to patient care accept account-
ability only to those professional associations that provide
a licence to practise and do not accept accountability to
voluntary professional associations that do not provide
such a licence.
Political accountability reflects the fragmentation of
hierarchical accountabilities between universities and the
NHS. Because at the national level political accountability
for the NHS and universities is located in different govern-
ment departments, there is no unified stewardship, over-
sight and scrutiny of all stages of health research by
elected officials. At the local level, many universities and
teaching hospitals establish strategic alliances with medical
research charities, partnerships with industry, and patient
and public involvement forums, through which they can
be directly accountable to research users and participants,
but this form of accountability is still in its infancy.
One particular mechanism that is most successful in
improving accountability for research to the community
is research funding provided by the NIHR and the De-
partment of Health. These two funders have established
processes and commit significant resources to promote
the involvement of patients and the public in research
[47]. This funding provides academic and clinical partners
with incentives to involve patients, the public, and carers
in setting research priorities and, where appropriate, help-
ing direct research activity. It is also essential that clini-
cians and researchers are involved in any priority-setting
exercise to establish feasibility of the research and also to
recognise the importance to their patients of the topic of
that research.
Accountability for education and training
A recent parliamentary inquiry concluded that the
current education and training system is “too com-
plex… and that accountability is poor” [48]. The fragmen-
tation and separation of accountability for undergraduate
medical education, junior doctor training, specialty train-
ing, and academic training between university and NHS
partners results in a broken continuum of knowledge and
experience for tomorrow’s doctors. Contrary to the calls of
academic and clinical leaders to allow universities to as-
sume responsibility for postgraduate education and train-
ing [49], the latest government reforms have missed an
opportunity to reduce the separation of undergraduate
and postgraduate education and training in universities
and the NHS respectively, and have in fact increased it.
Hierarchical accountability for undergraduate edu-
cation and training lies with universities. The Higher
Education Funding Council for England – which is an
arm’s-length funding council of the Department for
Business, Innovation and Skills – plans and funds uni-
versity places for medical undergraduates in accordance
with the workforce requirements of the NHS. Universities
run medical schools, provide non-clinical teaching, and
award degrees.
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Hierarchical accountability for postgraduate education
and training lies with postgraduate deaneries that, under
the latest government reforms, have been incorporated
into Local Education and Training Boards (LETBs). The
latter are statutory committees of a new NHS statutory
health authority – Health Education England – that
plans and funds clinical training posts. As part of LETBs,
postgraduate deaneries commission and quality-manage
specialty training provided by teaching hospitals and
general practitioners, and academic physician-scientist
training provided by universities [50].
Legal accountability for education and training is di-
vided between the NHS, universities, and professional
regulatory bodies. An important addition is that post-
graduate deaneries have to comply with the UK Employ-
ment Agencies Act because formally they are not part of
the higher education sector and are instead treated by law
as employment agencies. Moreover, postgraduate deaner-
ies and teaching hospitals have to comply with European
Union regulations, which often have a major impact on
postgraduate education and training. For example, accord-
ing to the Working Time Directive, junior doctors can
work a maximum of 48 hours per week (including inactive
on-call time).
Professional accountability fully rests with profes-
sional regulatory bodies. Following the merger of the Post-
graduate Medical Education Training Board, a government
body that previously regulated postgraduate education and
training, with the General Medical Council (GMC) in 2010,
the medical profession became responsible for regulating
all stages of medical education and training. While the
GMC quality-assures education and training programmes
at universities and postgraduate deaneries, medical royal
colleges are responsible for setting and overseeing the
specialty curricula within these programmes and for
awarding qualifications and memberships.
Political accountability at the national level is split
between the two government departments, and thus there
is no aligned stewardship, oversight and scrutiny of the
entire continuum of knowledge and experience across
undergraduate and postgraduate education and training.
At the local level, many university medical schools and
teaching hospitals assume accountability for the education
and training of health professionals to the local commu-
nity, region, and nation they serve [51], but it is yet to be
formally established.
How can AHSCs and AHSNs address deficits in
accountability through alignment?
Although government policies to promote AHSCs and
AHSNs provide academic and clinical partners with sym-
bolic and monetary incentives to improve collaboration,
the government has stopped short of reforming the exist-
ing accountability relationships to allow closer academic-
clinical integration. Accountability relationships in the
universities and healthcare providers that form core
constituent parts of AHSCs and AHSNs remain complex
and fragmented, as summarised in Table 1. Therefore,
local academic and clinical leaders face the challenge of
improving accountability for the tripartite mission without
the prospect of a fundamental system redesign that would
support fully integrated governance. There is a growing
consensus on both sides of the Atlantic that, when funda-
mental reform is not politically feasible, the joint working
of the component parts of academic medicine can be
strengthened, and thus accountability for its tripartite
mission improved, only through improved alignment
[7,23,52,53].
Alignment of institutional accountability, goals and
activities within NHS/university partnerships creates a
foundation on which to build relationships with other
stakeholders in the health and social care sector. While
local partnerships centred around NHS trusts can most
obviously influence acute care provision, they can also
(if carefully constructed) bring the same academic rigour
to the entire patient pathway from the promotion of
health through to the management of chronic illness in
the community. At its core, this model is dependent on
partnerships, and the creation of AHSCs and AHSNs
has the potential to greatly facilitate this model of
working, promoting interaction between stakeholders
from academia, the NHS, public health, local govern-
ment, and industry. Importantly, clinicians and scientists
can begin to work with parts of the health care sector to
develop and evaluate interventions that can promote good
health and prevent disease, thereby delivering patient
benefit at an earlier stage, where it can have more impact.
North West London provides interesting examples to
demonstrate various alignment mechanisms that academic
and clinical leaders can use to improve accountability lo-
cally. It also exemplifies the importance of local initiative
and leadership in pursuing local health improvements,
and illustrates the contemporaneous development of a
bottom-up partnership and the national AHSN scheme.
In 2009, academic and clinical partners at Imperial
College London and the Imperial College Healthcare
NHS Trust established the first AHSC in England to
foster academic-clinical collaboration, focusing mainly
on bridging the translational gap between discoveries
and innovations in the lab and new treatments and
ways of caring for patients in the clinic [4,7]. In 2011, a
review of the AHSC conducted by one of the authors
(AD) concluded that North West London would benefit
from a wider partnership to drive innovation and im-
plementation at a larger scale and a faster pace, i.e.
speeding up the adoption of innovation and closing the
gap between what is known to be best practice and
what is actually delivered by many NHS trusts [55].
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The evidence for this review was collected for adminis-
trative and policy purposes. It was based on expert advice
from the review steering board, engagement with staff at
the Imperial College AHSC, and discussions with wider
NHS and academic stakeholders in North West London.
Given that there has been no systematic evaluation of
AHSCs in England, this review provided unique insights
into various alignment mechanisms that can be used at
Imperial College and, possibly, other AHSCs.
Imperial College AHSC
The AHSC at Imperial College London and Imperial
College Healthcare NHS Trust was not only the first
AHSC in England, but it was also characterised by a
unique organisational model. Whereas all other English
AHSCs implemented the “joint partnership board” model,
the Imperial College AHSC pursued the “joint leadership
and management” model [7]. This latter model can be
explained using the following three dimensions of med-
ical school-clinical relationships derived from the US
literature [56]:
 Clinical enterprise organisation. Unlike the clinical
enterprises of the other English AHSCs, which were
comprised of several independent NHS trusts, the
clinical enterprise of the Imperial College AHSC was
comprised of a single NHS trust. It was created as
part of the AHSC project in 2007 through the
merger of two acute hospital trusts, and at that time
it became the largest NHS trust in England.
 Academic-clinical enterprise integration. Whereas
the other English AHSCs created joint partnership
boards for leaders from separate organisations to
co-ordinate the delivery of the tripartite mission
across the organisational divide, the Imperial College
AHSC pursued the strategy of academic-clinical
enterprise integration based on joint leadership
and management appointments, such as the dean
of the medical school/CEO of the clinical enterprise,
and chairs of academic departments/chiefs of
clinical services.
 Authority position of the chief academic officer over
the clinical enterprise. In contrast with the other
English AHSCs, where the chief academic officer
(i.e., the highest-ranking official responsible for the
academic mission) did not have any formal executive
authority over the clinical enterprise, the joint
appointment of the dean/CEO at the Imperial
College AHSC provided the chief academic officer
with executive authority over the clinical enterprise.
The “joint leadership and management” model proved
to be highly successful in achieving a transformational
shift in academic-clinical collaboration and creating the
first AHSC in England in 2007 [4]. However, it did not
prove to be viable in the long run due to significant fi-
nancial challenges for both the academic and clinical
enterprises during the economic downturn. While the
academic enterprise faced the challenge of addressing
changes to higher education funding streams, the clin-
ical enterprise faced the challenge of rebalancing its
finances in the face of no real terms growth of revenues
from clinical services. Given that under the current
“unlinked partners” model of academic-clinical relation-
ships in England the cross-subsidisation of academic and
clinical missions is impossible, the academic and clinical
enterprises at the Imperial College AHSC had to face their
financial challenges separately.
Table 1 Accountability relationships in universities and healthcare providers that form core constituent parts of AHSCs
and AHSNs
Universities: Medical schools Healthcare providers: Hospitals and GPs
Hierarchical Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS); university. Department of Health (DH); NHS trusts/FTs; GP practices/CCGs.
Legal Health research legislation and regulatory bodies [35]; higher
education legislation; Quality Assurance Agency for Higher
Education; undergraduate medical education and research
funding grants including the DH’s National Institute for Health
Research (NIHR) and contracts with BIS’s higher education and
research funding councils, medical research charities, industry
partners, and students.
Healthcare legislation and regulatory bodies [54]; National Audit
Office; Care Quality Commission; Monitor (economic regulator); Office
of Fair Trading; health research legislation and regulatory bodies [35];
postgraduate medical education and training contracts with Health
Education England and Local Education and Training Boards; health
service contracts between commissioners (CCGs and NHS England)
and NHS trusts/FTs; national contract between GPs and NHS England;
research grants and contracts with NIHR, medical research charities,
and industry partners.
Professional General Medical Council, medical royal colleges and faculties;
Academy of Medical Sciences; national and international
professional associations; research community peers;
university research ethics committees.
General Medical Council; medical royal colleges and faculties; NHS
medical director; NHS trust/FT medical director; NHS trust/FT clinical
governance and risk management peer groups.
Political Parliament; BIS; NHS and industry partners; public involved
in research; local and global patient communities.
Parliament, NHS England (and through its mandate, DH); local
authorities’ overview and scrutiny committees; patient and public
representatives’ Healthwatch; NHS trust/FT non-executive directors;
NHS FT governors and members.
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Following the departure of the founding dean/CEO
to take up a new international role, the decision was
taken to separate this appointment and, subsequently,
the Imperial College AHSC moved towards the “joint
partnership board” organisational model based on a formal
joint working agreement and a strategic partnership board.
Moreover, similar to the other English AHSCs, the Imperial
College AHSC entered into an extended partnership with
other NHS organisations in its catchment area, i.e. North
West London. Overall, we can observe convergence in
organisational models between AHSCs in England.
The evolution of the organisational model of the Imper-
ial College AHSC has important implications for our
understanding of the role of leadership in AHSCs. It is
clear that in the case of the Imperial College AHSC
different organisational challenges required different
leadership models.
During the formation of the AHSC, the “joint leadership
and management” model was required in order to bring
academic and clinical partners together as an AHSC for
the first time, and to signal their commitment to the
principles of the AHSC. We can hypothesise that this
set of challenges is better addressed by “transformational
leadership” based on principles-driven work [57]. More-
over, it is plausible to assume that this set of challenges
was more effectively addressed by leaders with a consider-
able amount of institutional knowledge and well-developed
relationships with colleagues in both the academic and
clinical enterprises.
During the economic downturn, the “joint partnership
board” model was required in order to clearly demarcate
financial challenges and to separate accountabilities for
financial performance. We can hypothesise that this set
of challenges is better addressed by “transactional leader-
ship” characterised by strict performance and outcome
criteria [57]. We can also assume that this set of chal-
lenges is more effectively addressed by leaders with a
proven track record of successfully addressing similar
challenges in different institutions. More research is needed
in order to analyse these leadership issues empirically.
Imperial College Health Partners
In parallel with changes at the Imperial College AHSC
and following the recommendations of the sector review
by AD, academic and clinical partners in North West
London set out to create a wider partnership for the
distinct purpose of the speedy adoption and diffusion
of innovation. Consequently, and under the continued
leadership of AD as Chair, “Imperial College Health
Partners” (ICHP) was launched in June 2012 as a company
limited by guarantee [29] prior to the AHSN process. It is
relevant to note that personal relationships and leadership
were as important in this context as the factual business
case for joining the partnership, given the voluntary nature
of ICHP.
ICHP comprises Imperial College and the NHS organi-
sations of North West London, including acute hospital
care, mental health, community health, and primary care
(through clinical commissioning groups) [58]. Considerable
effort went into engaging primary care colleagues, both
as commissioners and providers, making the case for a
partnership bridging the provider-commissioner split that
so often tends to dominate day-to-day relationships.
Members pay an annual membership fee that funds a
small central executive team. The fee is the same for all
members, who each have one vote on the Board, reflecting
the values of the partnership of inclusiveness and equality.
The objectives of the partnership are three-fold: enab-
ling the discovery of best practice and speedy adoption;
consistent implementation of good practice; and working
with industry and international partners to create wealth
for the NHS. ICHP is very much a bottom-up initiative,
informed, funded and led locally and voluntary and,
therefore, unique in its nature and composition compared
to almost all other relationships and organisations in the
local health economy. At the same time as the partnership
established itself, NHS England announced the estab-
lishment of AHSNs across England. Given the almost
identical objectives of AHSNs and of ICHP, the partner-
ship applied for an AHSN licence. Consequently, ICHP
was designated as an AHSN in September 2013 and is
still expanding its membership to ensure public health
and industry are well-represented, though this has proven
difficult.
In addition to the AHSC, there are other partnerships
nested within ICHP that help align accountabilities for
academic and clinical missions in research and patient
care. The NIHR Imperial Biomedical Research Centre
(BRC) [59] and two NIHR Biomedical Research Units
(BRUs) [60] are bilateral NHS/university partnerships
between Imperial College London and its partner NHS
trusts that focus on translational biomedical research.
The NIHR London (North West) Comprehensive Local
Research Network (CLRN) is a multilateral partnership
between a large number of NHS organisations that aims
to increase participation in clinical research in all areas
of disease and healthcare [61]. The NIHR Collaboration
for Leadership in Applied Health Research and Care
(CLAHRC) for North West London is a multilateral part-
nership between a large number of NHS organisations,
universities, charities, and pharmaceutical companies that
works to accelerate the translation of research evidence
into practice across primary and secondary interfaces of
care [62]. Importantly, all research and implementation
projects supported by these NIHR partnerships have a
strong patient and public involvement element. For ex-
ample, all applications for CLAHRC funding must include
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plans to involve patients and the public in their research
and implementation activities [63].
ICHP is more than a loose affiliation of partners, but
less than a full merger in terms of accountabilities for
individual organisations within the partnership. How-
ever, the inbuilt stability and the signal that this sends
to external partners such as industry (partners have
committed for multiple years independently of changes
in government or AHSN funding, which was awarded for
one year in the first instance), the frequency of meetings
(the Board meets four times a year), and a strong sense of
mutuality implied in the legal form of the partnership
(CEOs are directors of the company with a range of re-
sponsibilities) will go some way to align incentives, build
trust, and increase accountability.
The operating model is based on a small central team
that is providing dedicated resources to pursue the ob-
jectives of the partnership. However, where ever possible
staff from partner organisations are seconded into specific
projects to ensure the necessary expertise and buy-in. All
of these are seen as crucial structural components to
achieve better outcomes across a fragmented sector. The
award of some government funding through a successful
AHSN application provides a further lever to align part-
ners in the sector and increase the scope. But it also
implies that conditions attached to the funding need
to be carefully balanced with local priorities, and the
constituent members of ICHP have expressed a strong
desire to ensure the sustainability and identity of the
original partnership.
Examples of alignment mechanisms
Overall, the evidence which was gathered as part of the
initial review of the AHSC at Imperial College London
[55], discussions to create ICHP [29], and the experience
of its implementation, suggest that stronger accountability
would be best achieved through alignment in a number of
ways at different levels of the partnership. In particular,
this is realised:
Through leadership and management changes at the top of
the partnership
First, a key principle of the partnership is an equally-
represented leadership and management structure. If there
is only limited cross-representation between academic
and clinical organisations on their boards, it is important
to create equally-represented leadership and management
structures for joint strategic planning and decision-
making, e.g. a strategic partnership board with a joint
executive group and specialist committees. Second, some
joint leadership and management appointments were
made so that there are senior staff who have combined
executive authority over the academic and clinical enter-
prises. Third, leaders are supported by a small and
dedicated central management team, which is funded
through membership fees as set out above.
Through changes to bring together staff at lower levels in
the partnership
First, several of the partnership projects are or will be run
through collaboration between member organisations
supported by the central team. This way it is easier to
bring academic and clinical staff together to focus on
specific diseases and organ systems if academic depart-
ments were to map onto clinical services. Second, one of
the medium-term aims is to move towards a single re-
search strategy for the whole partnership with alignment
of individual organisations’ research strategies. This can be
achieved in a number of ways, such as by appointing a
joint director of research, or by collocating partners’
research support functions in a joint research office.
This is also something that industry has identified as a
priority area. Third, fundraising efforts are being co-ordi-
nated to focus on joint capital projects and to avoid com-
peting for the same donors. However, this is not to replace
existing activity, but to harness complementarities across
the partnership where appropriate.
Through changes at all levels in the partnership
First, common measures of success are being identified
both across all projects and for each individual project.
Although academic and clinical partners use a variety of
metrics and indicators to measure their separate per-
formance, it is essential that they agree on a common
framework that measures the strength of the tripartite
mission in a balanced way. Second, a sense of unity and
common purpose has been instilled by adopting a joint
brand identity, running a joint website, circulating joint
information material, and publishing a joint annual re-
port with a common performance matrix. Third, where
differences in organisational culture between academic
and clinical partners form significant barriers to inno-
vation and collaboration, specific development plans will
be established at project level. Joint clinical, academic, and
managerial appointments also help to overcome these
barriers.
A future research agenda
Each of these alignment mechanisms has the potential
to counter the separation of accountability for patient care,
research, and education at the national level by improving
accountability for the tripartite mission from the bottom
up. In the absence of strong evidence about the best
mechanisms and their effectiveness in different settings,
evaluation and assessment of AHSCs and AHSNs is essen-
tial in order to determine the comparative effectiveness
of different alignment mechanisms. As more knowledge
is generated, it should become possible to identify the
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mechanisms of greatest leverage for achieving enhanced
accountability in different settings, and to see whether
such mechanisms are strong enough to overcome the
separation of accountability for the tripartite mission at
the national level. Ultimately, academic and clinical
leaders could use this knowledge to enhance the per-
formance of their AHSCs and AHSNs locally, as well as
to advocate particular reforms nationally.
While conducting evaluation and assessment of AHSCs
and AHSNs, it is imperative to develop standardised
metrics and key performance indicators in order to enable
both national and international comparisons. Given that
the overwhelming majority of patient care, research, and
education in England is funded by the government and
charities, they could use standardised metrics and indica-
tors to hold AHSCs and AHSNs accountable for the qual-
ity of patient care, research, and education. Moreover,
government agencies and charities could use standardised
metrics and indicators to ensure value for money for the
public investment in AHSCs and AHSNs through open
competition between institutions. There is a need for stan-
dardised metrics and indicators not only in England, but
also internationally [64]. This would allow academic and
clinical leaders to accelerate performance improvements
at their institutions by benchmarking and comparing
performance across countries and by identifying areas
of collaboration with their peers around the world.
Finally, future research should empirically address lead-
ership issues in AHSCs and AHSNs. The current paper
focused on structure rather than agency, i.e. on institutions
rather than leaders. It showed that the current account-
ability relationships make the structural integration of
universities and healthcare providers extremely unlikely
and, thus, local academic and clinical leaders face the
challenge of aligning their institutions within the frame-
work of the existing sub-optimal accountability relation-
ships. Moreover, leadership in academic-clinical settings
is different from leadership in traditional hierarchical
organisations: AHSC and AHSN leaders have the challenge
of “leading among leaders” [65]. However, research on
leadership in academic and clinical settings in England is
underdeveloped. Currently, there is no empirical research
on the leadership styles and characteristics of the leaders
that are most effective in AHSCs and AHSNs. Also, it is
currently unknown whether the most effective leaders
come from inside or outside of the institution. Therefore,
future research should empirically address leadership is-
sues in AHSCs and AHSNs in order to help institutions
select the right leaders, and help leaders-to-be understand
what is required to succeed.
Summary
At the heart of the challenge for AHSCs and AHSNs in
England to provide high-quality care, innovative research,
and world-class education, while also supporting wealth
creation and economic growth, is the separation of ac-
countabilities for the tripartite mission of patient care, re-
search, and education in different government departments.
It prevents universities and healthcare providers from
cross-subsidising academic and clinical missions and
from creating fully integrated AHSCs and AHSNs.
Given that a fundamental top-down system redesign to
allow the structural integration of universities and health-
care providers is extremely unlikely, local academic and
clinical leaders face the challenge of aligning their institu-
tions as a matter of priority in order to improve account-
ability for the tripartite mission from the bottom up.
It remains to be seen which alignment mechanisms are
most effective and whether they are strong enough to
counter the separation of accountabilities for the tripartite
mission of academic medicine at the national level, and
the unprecedented financial challenges that it faces. It also
remains to be seen whether AHSNs, which are not yet
partnerships in their own right, can achieve a level of
durability that is required to establish them as credible
organisations. Future research should focus on determin-
ing the comparative effectiveness of different alignment
mechanisms, developing standardised metrics and key
performance indicators, evaluating and assessing academic
health science centres and networks, and empirically
addressing leadership issues.
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